disk encryption | Linuxaria

Everything you need to know to become a security expert

Jul 022012

Article by Giuseppe Sanna

Do you know what you should do to stay away from viruses, bruteforce and all these bad things? There are three possibilities. First, we could not buy a computer or, if you really want to buy it, do not turn it on! or as a last resort (but far less secure) does not ever connect it to any network and use only certified software from CD that you know.

In short, this shows that every operating system that we install has some bug and security flaw. Obviously there are those who have less. Our loved Linux distributions, for example, are among the more secure systems, but not impenetrable. Today, in this short article, we will see how the best of the worst hackers works to get our data, such as PIN and keyword, or just to discover our deepest secrets. And please remember that we’ll take a look at these techniques, as learning tool to be ready to “defend” ourself and our devices from these attacks. Continue reading »

Protect Linux from cold boot attacks with TRESOR

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Apr 052012

While reading an interesting Blog I discovered a new treasure: TRESOR, in short TRESOR is a secure implementation of AES which is resistant against cold boot attacks and other attacks on main memory.

If like me you wonder what a cold boot attack is, Princeton University can help us :

Contrary to popular assumption, DRAMs used in most modern computers retain their contents for seconds to minutes after power is lost, even at operating temperatures and even if removed from a motherboard. Although DRAMs become less reliable when they are not refreshed, they are not immediately erased, and their contents persist sufficiently for malicious (or forensic) acquisition of usable full-system memory images. This phenomenon limits the ability of an operating system to protect cryptographic key material from an attacker with physical access. We use cold reboots to mount attacks on popular disk encryption systems — BitLocker, FileVault, dm-crypt, and TrueCrypt — using no special devices or materials. We experimentally characterize the extent and predictability of memory remanence and report that remanence times can be increased dramatically with simple techniques.